The Governance of the Mitigation of the Baltic Sea Eutrophication: Exploring the Challenges of the Formal Governing System by Nina Tynkkynen et al.
The Governance of the Mitigation of the Baltic Sea
Eutrophication: Exploring the Challenges of the Formal
Governing System
Nina Tynkkynen, Paula Scho¨nach, Mia Pihlajama¨ki,
Dmitry Nechiporuk
Abstract This article focuses on the governing system of
the mitigation of eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. Policies
and measures of the Baltic Sea coastal countries, the
macro–regional (HELCOM) level, and the level of the
European Union are described and governance challenges
explicated. We found that the main challenges at different
governance levels include: differences between coastal
countries in terms of environmental conditions including
environmental awareness, overlaps of policies between
different levels, the lack of adequate spatial and temporal
specification of policies, and the lack of policy integration.
To help to meet these challenges, we suggest closer
involvement of stakeholders and the public, the improve-
ment of the interplay of institutions, and the introduction of
a ‘‘primus motor’’ for the governance of the mitigation of
eutrophication in the Baltic Sea.
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INTRODUCTION
The Baltic Sea environment is among the most persistently
addressed political issues in the Baltic Sea region (e.g.,
Hjorth 1996; VanDeveer 2011). Various arrangements
shape the efforts to protect the Baltic Sea marine envi-
ronment, including the European Union (EU) and the
Helsinki Convention with its governing body the Helsinki
Commission, HELCOM. At the same time, the Baltic Sea
is regarded as one of the most polluted marine environ-
ments in the world. There is a stark contrast between the
formally successful governance system and the actual state
of the Baltic Sea. In particular, this applies to the problem
of eutrophication, which is regarded as the most intricate
environmental problem of the Baltic Sea (e.g., Wulff et al.
2007; HELCOM 2009). The extensive nutrient input to the
Baltic Sea originates from the large catchment area com-
prising fourteen countries1 with over 85 million people.
The main sources of nutrients include natural outflow from
land, up-welling of phosphorus-rich deep water (i.e.,
internal load), atmospheric deposition of nitrogen, and,
most importantly, anthropogenic sources such as municipal
and single household wastewater, agriculture, and industry
(e.g., HELCOM 2009). Eutrophication has negative
impacts on recreational activities, biodiversity, and liveli-
hoods, such as fishing and tourism. Some success in the
reduction of nutrient load from point sources has been
achieved, but nutrient input from diffuse sources, espe-
cially from agriculture, is still a major challenge.
The complexity of human activities causing heavy
anthropogenic stress, the unique ecological characteristics
of the sea, and the dynamic and complex nature of eco-
logical processes make the management of the eutrophi-
cation problem intricate. The nature and severity of the
problem vary between different basins (see e.g., HELCOM
2009). Nutrient emissions drift from estuaries and coastal
waters to the Baltic proper and to the territorial waters of
other countries. Russia and Poland are the major sources of
waterborne nutrients, but they do not suffer from extensive
eutrophication in their territorial waters as their nutrient
loads drift to other parts of the Baltic Sea. In terms of
societal perceptions of the problem, eutrophication lacks
the definitional, ideological, and symbolic clarity typical
for many other environmental issues. This makes it
1 The Baltic Sea encompasses nine coastal countries: Denmark,
Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Finland, and
Sweden. The other countries in the catchment area are Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, Ukraine, Belarus, and Norway.




speculatively a less ‘‘trendy’’ issue compared with envi-
ronmental problems such as climate change (Pihlajama¨ki
and Tynkkynen 2011a; see also Lundberg 2013).
In this article, we examine the governing system of the
Baltic Sea eutrophication mitigation. According to Kern
(2011), the governing system is a social system including
different institutions and steering mechanisms that con-
tribute to the development of a ‘‘system-to-be governed,’’
in this case the Baltic Sea ecosystem. The governing sys-
tem and the ‘‘system-to-be-governed’’ form a dynamic
relationship that is affected by the diverse, complex, and
vulnerable character of both. The governing system of the
Baltic Sea environment originates from the establishment
of the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea area in 1974 (HELCOM
2008; Ra¨sa¨nen and Laakkonen 2008), and has evolved
from a single convention to a multifaceted governing sys-
tem of the common sea especially since the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991. The transition of former state
socialist countries to market economy, the global agenda
on sustainable development, and the enlargement of the
European Union, have triggered the development of vari-
ous cooperative arrangements aiming at managing the
Baltic Sea environment over the last three decades
(Joas et al. 2008). In this system, international and EU
policymaking has gained an increasing importance. At the
same time, a variety of new, broader forms of cooperation
have emerged including private and public actors (Ga¨nzle
2011; Kern 2011; VanDeveer 2011). Despite the growing
number of nongovernmental actors involved, national
governance is still considered the backbone of the gov-
erning system of the Baltic Sea environment (Kern 2011;
Lundberg 2013).
This article portrays a synthesis and describes the main
conclusions of the research project PROBALT: ‘‘Improv-
ing societal conditions for the Baltic Sea protection,’’
carried out as part of the BONUS? program during 2009–
2011 under the coordination of the Finnish Institute of
International Affairs. In the project, main challenges of the
formal governing system of the mitigation of the Baltic Sea
eutrophication were scrutinized with the help of case
studies that focused on the European Union, HELCOM,
and all but one of the riparian countries, i.e., Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and
Sweden2 (for case studies see Pihlajama¨ki and Tynkkynen
2011b). In this article, we refer to the results of the cases
conducted by the authors of this article (Sweden, Finland,
Russia, and HELCOM), and on the synthesis articles of the
remaining cases, published in the final report of the project
by those project members that are not among the authors of
this article (Dmochowska and Szaniawska 2011; Hauta-
kangas and Ollikainen 2011; Jokela 2011; Schumacher
2011a, b). While appreciating the growing involvement of
a variety of other actors, this article focuses on the formal
governing system as set out in the scope of the PROBALT
project that is based on the state-centricity of the contem-
porary governing system (see Kern 2011).
The research data for all case studies consist of policy
documents and interviews with representatives of the
national level actors, HELCOM, and the EU. Interviewees
represent the domains of politics and administration,
national governments, and ministries, as well as national
and EU agencies. Also other stakeholders, including rep-
resentatives of the research communities and interest
groups such as farmers’ unions and NGOs, were inter-
viewed in the project. The interviews were thematic and
semistructured, implying that questions varied according to
the field of expertise of the interviewee, and the answers
were of free format, conversational style. The interviews
were recorded and transcribed. The number of interviews
totaled 171, varying between 10 (Russia) and 33 (EU) (see
Table 1).
The interviews and other data were analyzed by apply-
ing the empirical methods of qualitative content analysis
(Roberts 1997). In general, the analysis proceeded by first
identifying the key elements of each country’s national
Baltic Sea eutrophication prevention endeavors and the
most important mechanisms to support them. Then, the
interviews and relevant documents were analyzed with the
focus on structural and institutional weaknesses of the
present governing system of the Baltic Sea concerning the
problem of eutrophication. The challenges identified are
presented as four summarizing and interlinked categories.
The approach to studying governance applied in this
article is focused on explaining the polity and policy
dimensions of governance rather than that of politics (see
Pahl-Wostl 2009). That is, instead of explaining the way of
policy-making and political processes, we concentrate on
analyzing the institutional structures that are in the core of
the governing system: the main institutions, policies and
actors at each administrative level, and the main gover-
nance challenges met at these levels.
THE GOVERNING SYSTEM OF THE MITIGATION
OF EUTROPHICATION IN THE BALTIC SEA
Overview of Governance at the Levels of the EU and
HELCOM
Following the enlargement in 2004, the European Union
comprises all the Baltic Sea riparian countries except
Russia, and a number of noncoastal states that contribute to
2 Due to a force majeure, a case study on Denmark was unfortunately
not conducted.
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nutrient input via air pollution (e.g., Great Britain, the
Netherlands and Belgium). The EU has developed into an
important institutional and legislative power in the pro-
tection of the Baltic Sea (see Schumacher 2012). As
described by Schumacher (2011a), the first EU regulations
aiming to reduce nutrient input into water bodies, the
Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) and the
Nitrates Directive (ND), were adopted in 1991. These
directives prescribe different standards for sewage treat-
ment and farming practices, respectively. Another instru-
ment for nutrient input reduction is the agri-environmental
program of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),
through which compensation can be paid to farmers who
carry out certain water protection measures. Since 2001,
airborne emissions of, e.g., nitrogen oxides and ammonia
have been addressed in the National Emission Ceilings
Directive (NECD). More comprehensive instruments
include the Water Framework Directive (WFD), adopted in
2000, and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive
(MSFD), adopted in 2008. The main objective of the for-
mer is to reach good ecological status of European surface
waters and groundwater by 2015, while the latter aims to
achieve or maintain such a status in the marine environ-
ment by 2020. In order to implement these directives, the
member states were invited to develop national water and
marine protection plans through which the targets in their
territorial waters could be met. By introducing these reg-
ulative tools, the EU has taken a stronghold over eutro-
phication-relevant policy developments in its member
states (Schumacher 2011a). More to the point, the EU
showed increased interest toward the Baltic Sea region by
adopting the first EU macroregional strategy, the Strategy
for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) in 2009. The overall
aim of the strategy is to save the sea from environmental
degradation, connect the region, and increase prosperity
through a number of actions and projects addressing the
most relevant challenges and opportunities in the region,
including eutrophication.
The HELCOM, in turn, covers the whole region: all
coastal countries are contracting parties to the Helsinki
Convention. Also other relevant governments (e.g., Belarus
and Ukraine) are invited to participate or may apply for an
observer status (interview with HELCOM expert, 2010).
Over 130 ‘‘hot spots,’’ mostly related to inadequate
wastewater treatment, were listed in a HELCOM Joint
Comprehensive Environmental Action Program (JCP) in
1992, and many of them were eliminated during the fol-
lowing decade. Currently, the main tool of HELCOM is the
Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), agreed in 2007 by the
member states to restore the good ecological status of the
Baltic Sea by 2021 (HELCOM 2007). The BSAP intro-
duces provisional, countrywise nutrient input reductions
targets, which are based on the current nutrient input and
the previous reduction efforts. The implementation of the
BSAP is carried out through national implementation
programs. In recent years, cooperation between the EU and
HELCOM regarding the Baltic Sea protection has signifi-
cantly increased (HELCOM expert, pers.comm. 2010). For
example, the national marine strategies of the EU MSFD,
as well as the environmental segment of the EU Strategy
for the Baltic Sea Region, are based on the regionally
agreed environmental goals and objectives (i.e., the HEL-
COM Baltic Sea Action Plan). In addition, synergies in the
implementation processes of the three have been utilized
across the region (e.g., Pihlajama¨ki et al. 2013).
Overview of the National Governance
The Baltic Sea coastal countries have their own national
water and marine policies and legislations that regulate the
Baltic Sea related issues in their territories. The national
Baltic Sea protection efforts vary in respect of the ambition,
the capacity, and experience of environmental administra-
tion, funding, and continuity (Jokela 2011; Dmochowska
and Szaniawska 2011; Nechiporuk et al. 2011; Pihlajama¨ki
2011; Scho¨nach 2011; Schumacher 2011b). Some of the
countries have aggregated environmental protection strate-
gies that include the Baltic Sea protection policies as one
issue among other topics (Estonia, Latvia, Sweden) and
others have designed documents targeting especially the
Table 1 Background of interviewed persons in the PROBALT project
Academia NGO Regional authority National authority Local authority Other TOTAL
Baltic states 9 3 – 10 – – 22
Germany 4 6 7 5 – 4 26
Finland 18 1 1 10 2 4 36
Poland 8 1 5 2 5 10 31
Sweden 4 3 – 5 1 – 13
Russia 2 4 3 – 1 – 10
European Union 4 8 4 7 – 10 33
Total 49 26 20 39 9 28 171
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Baltic Sea/marine protection issues (Russia, Lithuania,
Finland, Poland, Germany) (Pihlajama¨ki and Tynkkynen
2011b). These strategies include the goals expressed in the
EU regulation and, to a varying extent, those of the HEL-
COM BSAP. National Implementation Programmes of the
BSAP vary between the coastal countries remarkably
(HELCOM expert, pers.comm. 2010; see HELCOM 2013a).
To characterize the Baltic Sea coastal countries in terms
of the protection of the Baltic Sea, Finland and Sweden
have often been referred to as ‘‘forerunners,’’ whereas the
former state socialist countries are considered ‘‘laggards’’
(Darst 2001). The huge but slowly shrinking gap in the
living standards between Eastern and Western shores of the
Baltic Sea has materialized in significant differences with
regard to the implementation of HELCOM’s recommen-
dations (HELCOM 2003). Moreover, differences in
socioeconomic, political, and administrative systems crys-
tallize in societal activities such as cultures of public par-
ticipation, these in turn conditioning the diffusion of new
policy practices especially in Russia. The EU membership
of the three Baltic States and Poland—the implementation
of environmental acquis commuanutaire3—has naturally
brought environmental conditions of these countries closer
to those of the Nordic countries and Germany. The EU
directives are transposed into the national legislation of
each member state. The freedom of the member states in
terms of directives’ contents is limited, but national legis-
lations can provide stricter requirements than the directive.
For example, in Germany, the urban wastewater purifica-
tion rates are higher than required by the UWWTD or even
by the BSAP (Schumacher 2011b). Moreover, the direc-
tives do not explicitly define governance structures and
processes; hence, countrywise solutions vary in the role of
central agencies and the division of responsibilities
between authorities (Pihlajama¨ki and Tynkkynen 2011b;
Pihlajama¨ki et al. 2013).
Because Russia is perhaps the most important single
actor in the current context, not least as it is not a member
of the EU, we focus in this article on its national position
vis-a-vis the Baltic Sea governance. The case study on
Russia reveals that Russia’s input into the Baltic Sea pro-
tection activities has been inconsistent because of past
socioeconomic difficulties and political instabilities,
including repeated reorganising of the environmental
administration and blurred division of responsibilities
between the federal and regional authorities. This has led to
a lack of continuity in environmental policies (interview
with a regional authority in Russia, 2009). However, as
indicated by the interviewees, Russia has expressed a keen
interest in promoting HELCOM as the main actor in
environmental protection of the Baltic Sea; especially after
the eastern enlargement of the EU to reduce the dominance
of the EU in the Baltic Sea region. In a broad sense, Russia
and the EU differ in their approaches toward the strategic
comprehension of the environmental policy in the Baltic
Sea. In spite of the diversity of declared goals of the
‘‘National Program of Measures to Improve the Health and
Rehabilitation of the Baltic Sea ecosystem’’ (2012–2020),
the Baltic Sea protection appears to be for Russian actors,
the first and foremost, a purely technocratic problem,
which can be solved by reconstructing wastewater treat-
ment facilities in St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Lenin-
grad oblast regions (interview with a regional authority,
Russia 2009; see also Nechiporuk et al. 2011).
MAIN CHALLENGES OF THE GOVERNANCE OF
THE EUTROPHICATION MITIGATION IN THE
BALTIC SEA REGION
Drawing on the analysis of interviews and other data
conducted within the PROBALT project, we identified four
sets of challenges as the most serious ones hampering the
effective governance of the eutrophication mitigation in the
Baltic Sea. In the following, we explicate these challenges
and provide some suggestions on how to overcome them.
The European Union Versus HELCOM
Our analysis reveals that the governing system of the Baltic
Sea eutrophication mitigation is the first and foremost
hampered by the absence of a supranational regulatory
body, or a ‘‘primus motor’’ that would cover all counties in
the catchment of the sea as well as other relevant actors.
Currently, the two candidates for such a role are the EU
and HELCOM. The EU directives play a decisive role in
addressing the Baltic Sea eutrophication, but besides not
including Russia, these directives unfortunately often fail
to consider the unique characteristics of the Baltic Sea. The
directives, for example, the UWWTD, are generally less
strict than the HELCOM recommendations, and therefore,
too lax to effectively combat eutrophication (HELCOM
2006). More recent directives, such as the MSFD and
WFD, are more promising in this respect, as their imple-
mentation plans are drawn separately to meet the needs of
specific marine and water areas. These directives allow,
however, the member states under certain conditions to
extend the target year to 2027 (WFD) and exceptions in
reaching the target (MSFD). This produces an implemen-
tation delay that hampers the protection of the Baltic Sea
(Schumacher 2011a). Furthermore, agreeing on a more
stringent Baltic Sea protection plan within the framework
3 The entire body of European legislation, comprising all the treaties,
regulations, and directives adopted by the European Union.
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of the EU is difficult if not impossible, as many of the
member states, such as the Baltic states (Jokela 2011) and
Poland (Dmochowska and Szaniawska 2011), are strug-
gling to fulfill even the currently existing requirements.
The EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is also prob-
lematic in many ways. Although the EU agri-environ-
mental payment scheme offers financial support to
complete water protection projects, due to its inflexibility
and long-term commitment requirements as well as labo-
rious bureaucratic paper work related to it, some farmers
are reluctant to apply for the same (e.g., interview with a
scientist, Sweden 2011). For instance, in Sweden, funds are
not being utilized in full (interview with a scientist, Swe-
den 2011).
Despite these challenges, our analysis indicates that the
implementation of the EU directives is a top priority over
the HELCOM recommendations in all EU member states
(Pihlajama¨ki and Tynkkynen 2011b). This is the first and
foremost point due to the existing enforcement power of
the EU, i.e., the member states face significant sanctions if
they fail to implement the various directives. The position
of the coastal states toward HELCOM, in turn, is more
multifaceted (e.g., interviews with two civil servants and
one NGO representative in Sweden 2011; Dmochowska
and Szaniawska 2011; Jokela 2011). HELCOM recom-
mendations have been enforced to a varying extent in
national policies and legislation of the coastal states. The
main deficiency of HELCOM is that, contrary to the EU
framework directives, sanctions for noncommitment of the
HELCOM recommendations do not exist (HELCOM
expert, pers.comm. 2010; VanDeveer 2011). This generates
lack of commitment, and hence, recommendations put
forth by HELCOM do not materialize effectively enough in
national regulations, let alone in implementation. The
BSAP as the main tool of HELCOM to manage eutrophi-
cation has been accused by NGOs for not including those
ambitious actions originally included in the proposals of
the plan, for not treating the countries equally, and for
forgetting to cover socioeconomic aspects. More to the
point, HELCOM is criticized for concentrating mainly on
scientific activities and accumulating data instead of sup-
porting the concrete implementation of the proposed
measures (interviews with two NGO representatives in
Sweden 2011; interview with a scientist in Finland, 2009).
On a more positive note, the greatest assets of HEL-
COM include the participation of all nine coastal countries,
the possibility to address the whole catchment area, and its
long history and distinguished role as a forum for the
macroregional Baltic Sea protection. HELCOM has also
resonance in Russia, where, as a non-EU member, HEL-
COM is the main transnational governing body for the
environment of the Baltic Sea (e.g., interview with a sci-
entist in Russia, 2009). As a major polluter and a
geopolitical actor, Russia’s interests need careful consid-
eration. This implies that the position of the EU as the
‘‘primus motor’’ of Baltic Sea environmental protection is
not self-evident, even if more stringent EU regulation that
takes specific conditions of the Baltic Sea and the eutro-
phication problem into account is allowed to be in place.
Socioeconomic Differences and the Lack of
Environmental Awareness
The historically rooted differences of the countries’
socioeconomic situations and capacities are among the key
challenges for effective governance of the Baltic Sea
environment in general and eutrophication mitigation in
particular. We argue that existing policies do not take these
differences into account in an adequate manner. Above all,
this applies to the HELCOM BSAP, in which the highest
nutrient reduction requirements are set for developing
economies in the region, namely Russia, Poland, Latvia,
and Lithuania, leaving Finland and Estonia with the
lightest burden. Thus, the minimized cost for implemen-
tation of the plan, calculated up to €4.7 million annually
(Wulff et al. 2014), is very unevenly distributed compared
with the GDP or other indicators of economic performance.
This is regarded as an unfair division of burden and lessens
the incentive for implementation, for example, in Poland
(Dmochowska and Szaniawska 2011).
Another example of how socioeconomic differences
affect the governance of eutrophication mitigation is pro-
vided by the agricultural sector. Before the 2004 EU
enlargement, the intensity of agricultural production and
the consequent use of fertilizers in, for example, Poland
were moderate mainly due to poor economic conditions.
However, the EU CAP has promoted intensified agricul-
tural production throughout the region and is expected to
result in substantial growth of the agricultural sector in
Poland and subsequently increased nutrient leaching
(Dmochowska and Szaniawska 2011). At the same time,
the implementation of environmental measures to reduce
nutrient run-off through the national agri-environmental
programs (as part of the EU CAP) depend on the willing-
ness and possibility of the state to provide co-funding from
their national budgets (e.g., interview with an environ-
mental authority, Finland 2011). In Poland, it remains yet
to be seen how environmental protection will be guaran-
teed in the intensified agricultural production (Dmo-
chowska and Szaniawska 2011).
With regard to the awareness concerning the problem of
eutrophication, our analysis supports the findings of Flash
Eurobarometer on Water (2009) and Ahtiainen et al.
(2012), which suggest that eutrophication is perceived as
the most severe environmental problem of the Baltic Sea in
Finland and Sweden, but not in Germany, Poland, the
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Baltic States and Russia. This can be explained by geo-
graphic, geopolitical, and historic-cultural reasons: Finland
and Sweden have the longest Baltic Sea coastlines, eco-
nomic activities concentrated along the coast and long
traditions of Baltic Sea related livelihoods, especially rec-
reation. In Russia, Germany and Poland, the geographic
distances of the capital cities from the Baltic Sea downplay
the national significance of the problems of the Baltic Sea.
This is reflected in that public knowledge concerning the
Baltic Sea eutrophication is somewhat poor and/or scien-
tifically contested, and media attention is scarce (Dmo-
chowska and Szaniawska 2011; Jokela 2011; Nechiporuk
et al. 2011; Schumacher 2011b). In the former socialist
countries, open access to information and public delibera-
tion is a new aspect; therefore, NGOs and other actors have
only relatively recently started to participate in the envi-
ronmental protection of the Baltic Sea (Jokela 2011). At
the level of the EU, the good environmental reputation of
the northern European countries leads to the false impres-
sion of a good environmental status of the Baltic Sea
(Schumacher 2011a).
Weak or pending environmental awareness poses a real
threat to the target of achieving a good ecological status of
the Baltic Sea. Growingly important instruments of envi-
ronmental policy-making such as public pressure, everyday
activism and environmentally friendly business culture all
benefit from a higher environmental awareness. Truly
effective policies can be planned only with the help of
those actors whose actions are critical with regard to the
problem (Haila 2008). Various stakeholders are also in the
key position when searching for cost-efficient measures to
decrease nutrient leakage. Enhancing cost-efficiency is
closely related to the question of prioritization of policies.
This, however, necessitates awareness on the problem and
personal interest: the implementation of protective mea-
sures often means costs to be carried even by individual
citizens, such as farmers or house owners. If not provided
with additional funding and especially when combined
with a lack of awareness, other expenditures may appear
more pressing.
Inadequate Spatial and Temporal Specification of
Policies
The existing governing system does not efficiently reach
out to all sources of nutrient leaching along the coastal
zones and in river catchments. This concerns agriculture in
particular, as the magnitude of nutrient leaching varies
significantly among the cultivated areas (e.g., interviews
with one scientist, one local politician, one civil servant at
MoA, and one NGO representative, Sweden 2011; inter-
view with two scientists, Finland 2009). This implies that
instead of implementing agri-environmental measures
equally across the region, the measures should be focused
where the benefit (i.e., the amount of nutrient reduction) is
the greatest. In general, this refers to cost-effective prac-
tices that introduce spatially specific environmental mea-
sures. Temporal specification, in turn, implies the
concentration of nutrient reduction efforts to sources from
which the greatest benefit (nutrient reduction) can be
achieved the quickest (interview with a scientist in Finland,
2009). Specification necessitates also a bottom-up
approach focusing on specific situations and differentiating
management practices with the strong involvement of rel-
evant stakeholders (interview with one scientist and one
local politician, Sweden, 2011; see also Haila 2008).
Based on our analysis, the existing policy instruments,
especially those included in the CAP, do not facilitate
effectively enough such spatial differentiation of policy
instruments and forms of implementation and have thus led
to inaccurate allocation of responsibilities and waste of
funds targeted to protection. Instead of focusing the mea-
sures to those areas where the potential benefit is the
greatest, the agri-environmental measures of the CAP are
implemented equally across the region. Participation in the
national agri-environmental programs is voluntary for the
farmers and includes a certain degree of freedom in the
selection of measures, which can also lead to an ineffective
allocation of measures in respect of eutrophication sensi-
tive areas, or in the worst case scenario, a complete lack of
them (e.g., interview with one scientist, Finland 2009;
interview with environmental authority, Finland 2011).
More to the point, not only the EU regulation but even
some national funding systems for water protection, e.g., in
Sweden, do not take spatial differences into account care-
fully enough, and hence protective measures are not carried
out cost-effectively (e.g., interviews of two civil servants at
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, two NGO
representatives and one scientist, Sweden 2011; see also
Lundqvist 2004). To some degree, spatial and temporal
inflexibility of impacts of measures is caused by inadequate
follow-up and evaluation and malfunctioning feedback
mechanisms (e.g., interviews with one local politician, one
scientist and two civil servants at the Swedish Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Sweden 2011). The best pos-
sible results are not reached if action cannot be readjusted
when the follow-up information identifies improvement
needs.
To advance temporal specification of policies, intermediate
steps toward final goals that are connected to technological
possibilities and would thus facilitate implementation of
policies need to be defined (interview with a university sci-
entist, Finland 2009). Such a temporal dimension is built in
NEFCO’s (Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation)
suggestion to develop a nutrient trading system in the Baltic
Sea (NEFCO 2008). Starting nutrient trading between point
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sources (e.g., urban wastewater treatment plants) would bring
reductions in nutrient loads quickly in contrast to the inevi-
tably slow progress achievable in agriculture (Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry of Finland 2010; Lankoski and Ol-
likainen 2011). Reduction of nutrient loads from urban
wastewater treatment plants by using a trading mechanism
would constitute roughly 70 % of the reduction targets set out
in the BSAP (Hautakangas and Ollikainen 2011). This
reduction is large and would, based on the consequent changes
in water quality and algal blooms, provide an opportunity to
reconsider and fine-tune the BSAP’s targets. Actually, this is
what the most recent 2013 HELCOM Ministerial Declaration
urges: it is agreed in the Declaration that further upgrading of
waste water treatment to fully implement the relevant HEL-
COM Recommendation will be prioritized (see HELCOM
2013b).
Insufficient Integration of Different Policy Sectors
Various activities throughout the catchment area (and
beyond) either directly or indirectly affect the state of the
sea. Therefore, the state of the Baltic Sea cannot be
improved by focusing exclusively on marine and water
protection, if all societal activities are not closely linked to
protective activities. Some of the EU policies are often
even contradictory, e.g., agricultural and environmental
policies, suffering from the lack of proper integration (Kern
2011; Schumacher 2011a). In the EU, agricultural deci-
sion-making has taken place within a rather isolated policy
network for many decades, and in many national cases
strong farming lobbyists are against more stringent envi-
ronmental policies while fearing for the loss of competi-
tiveness (interviews of two NGO representatives, Sweden
2011). The CAP is not in synergy with the WFD and
MSFD, instead the CAP gives counterproductive incen-
tives to nutrient input reduction by encouraging farmers to
increase both area under cultivation and intensity of pro-
duction (e.g., interview with a scientist, Finland 2009; see
also Lankoski and Ollikainen 2011). As a result environ-
mental impacts of agricultural policy actually undermine
the achievements of agri-environmental policy regarding
water protection. Furthermore, the agri-environmental
programs can be targeted toward a multitude of different
environmental goals and there is no legal obligation to
prioritize water protection (Guttenstein 2007). In fact, the
Commission has even requested Finland not to increase the
share of water protection related measures in its national
program (interview with a scientist and a former repre-
sentative of farmers union in Finland, 2011). Strong policy
fragmentation calls for an exhaustive reform, which
unfortunately the new CAP does not seem to be bring
about.
A better integration of policy sectors presupposes the
explication of interrelations between different policy areas,
taking the specific spatial, temporal and administrative
scales of the activities that are causing the problem as the
starting point for policy integration. In addition, trade-offs
and synergies between different policy, environmental and
agricultural sectors (also sectors like transportation,
energy, housing, fisheries) should be more systematically
taken into consideration at every governance level. Positive
effects—double benefits—could be expected both in regard
to other environmental objectives (e.g., climate protection
and biodiversity) and in terms of socioeconomic interests
(e.g., improved drinking-water quality, cost savings by
increasing fertilizer efficiency and improved conditions for
the tourism and fisheries sectors) (interview with one local
politician and one scientist, Sweden, 2011; Schumacher
2011a).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The examination of the governing system of the Baltic Sea
eutrophication mitigation reveals that the main challenges
for more effective governance are rooted in the boundaries
of different levels of the governing system and their
interactions. Furthermore, historically rooted differences in
socioeconomic circumstances, between the Nordic coun-
tries and Germany, and the former socialist states, Russia
in particular (see Jahn and Kuitto 2008; Kern, 2011), pose
yet another key challenge.
The existing governing system is a rather state-centric
one (Kern 2011). The state-centricity is an imperative that
cannot be forgotten, because there is no supranational
governing body that would transcend the sovereignty of all
countries in the catchment area. As brought up by some of
the experts interviewed in the PROBALT project, one
option to solve this problem would be a binding regional
agreement that would contrary to the existing Helsinki
Convention be fair, cost-effective and include mechanisms
of sanctions for noncompliance. However, such an agree-
ment may not be plausible given that the Helsinki Con-
vention is already in place. At minimum, the governing
system is in need of enhanced interplay between the
existing institutions and policies (see Oberthu¨r and Schram
Stokke 2011). The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
provides a good start, especially vis-a`-vis the interplay
between the EU MSFD and WFD and the HELCOM Baltic
Sea Action Plan. However, action driven strongly by the
EU excludes Russia. Furthermore, the dominant role of the
EU in the Baltic Sea protection is not greeted by Russia,
anxious to rebuild its former superpower status. Therefore,
the HELCOM is more likely to continue to be an important
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actor also in the future, and its policies should be revised
accordingly.
Furthermore, stakeholder engagement is a major con-
sideration that should be taken into the core of any
development not only to gain political legitimacy but also
for the purposes of spatial and temporal specification.
Without connecting with ‘‘on the ground’’ constituencies,
the governance system is unable to effectively reach out to
all sources of eutrophication in the catchment area and to
correct scale discrepancies between the problem and policy
instruments (Haila 2008). Improved stakeholder participa-
tion would encourage a change from the use of direct top-
down regulations to the introduction of incentive-based
flexible instruments and individual voluntary efforts to
protect the sea (see Hammer et al. 2011). But increasing
public participation is not an easy task and cannot be car-
ried out artificially on top of existing procedures. At the
core of enhancing broad stakeholder participation and
legitimation of policies is wide public acceptance and
desirability of the goals. This necessitates awareness of the
problem at all levels. Awareness can be raised by
increasing the publicity and media attention concerning the
problem of eutrophication. Events like the Baltic Sea
Action Summits are very important in this respect; also
environmental education plays a key role especially in the
long term.
In this article, we did not analyze the role of subnational
actors, although especially the EU legislation is often
implemented at local and regional levels (Kern 2011).
More to the point, nongovernmental actors for the gover-
nance of the mitigation of the Baltic Sea eutrophication
were left out of the scope of this article. This was because
the focus of the PROBALT project was on the formal
governing system. It should be noted, however, that sub-
national actors as well as nongovernmental actors have a
growing role in policy making and also in the implemen-
tation of already negotiated policies. Following from this
notion, a number of conclusions with regard to future
research needs can be drawn. From the viewpoint of policy
analysis, it would be important to focus sustained inquiry
not only on the ways in which spatial and temporal spec-
ification of policies could be carried out, but also on how
policy integration could be organized across policy sectors
and levels and actor groups in a way that encourages par-
ticipation and the inclusion of bottom-up perspectives in
policy-making. Last but not least, to guarantee the
requirement of visibility of the problem and to increase
knowledge on it, all sort of research should pay special
attention to the communication of results to the wider
public also in the future.
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